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“Everybody Likes a Drink.  Nobody Likes a Drunk”.  Alcohol, Health 
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Abstract 
This article examines the development of alcohol health education in Britain 
during the 1970s, using this as a way to explore the nature of public health 
and the place of the public within it.  Focusing on a set of local health 
education campaigns, an expert committee report on alcohol prevention and a 
public consultation exercise on alcohol, the article highlights the presence of 
three different ‘publics’.  Health education campaigns tended to focus on the 
individual drinker, but the drinking habits of the whole population were also of 
concern.  So too were the rights and responsibilities of citizen-consumers.  
These three publics – drinkers, the population and citizen-consumers – were 
often in conflict with one another, and though it was drinkers that became the 
object of alcohol policy, the needs of the population, and of citizen-consumers, 
could not be ignored.  
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In 1974, in the North East of England, the Health Education Council (HEC) 
launched a pilot programme to increase public awareness about alcohol 
problems.  Under the tag line ‘Everybody likes a drink.  Nobody likes a drunk.’ 
the campaign made use of billboard posters, advertisements in local 
newspapers and television commercials in order to encourage people in the 
region to ‘Drink in moderation’ and not ‘let alcohol go to your head.’  The 
campaign, designed by the well-known advertising agency Saatchi and 
Saatchi, reached a large proportion of the local population.  Around 90% of 
people surveyed said that they had watched the television advertisements, 
and 60% of respondents recalled seeing the campaign posters.1  Local 
alcohol treatment and advice services were inundated with people seeking 
help for alcohol problems, a sign, the HEC believed, of the initiative’s 
success.2   
Not everyone involved in the campaign, however, was so sure.  On the 
ground, service providers felt that they had not been consulted sufficiently 
about the campaign and that it was insensitive to local needs.  The 
programme’s methods were also unpopular, with the slogan ‘Everybody likes 
a drink. Nobody likes a drunk.’ attracting particular opprobrium.  Criticism of 
the campaign’s tactics was underpinned by more fundamental misgivings 
                                                        
1 George Cust, ‘Health Education about Alcohol in the Tyne Tees Area’, in 
Aspects of Alcohol and Drug Dependence, ed. by JS Madden, Robin Walker, 
and WH Kenyon (Kent: Pitman Medical, 1980), 117–22 (118). 
2 J. Budd, P. Gray and R. McCron, The Tyne Tees Alcohol Education 
Campaign : An Evaluation., 1983. 
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about the approach taken.  There was little consensus about what it meant to 
‘drink in moderation’ and whether or not a sceptical public could be convinced 
to consume alcohol ‘sensibly’.  Some experts, such as the leading addiction 
researcher Professor Griffith Edwards, argued that health education simply 
would not work, at least not alone.  Instead, Edwards suggested, more should 
be done to limit drinking at the societal level, as the number of people with 
alcohol problems was related to the overall amount of alcohol consumed by 
the population.3  Making sure that the price of alcohol did not decrease, and 
ensuring that adequate controls on the availability of drink remained in place, 
he suggested, would be more effective than health education in dealing with 
alcohol problems. 
Conflict over how to respond to alcohol related issues points to more 
fundamental difficulties faced by public health and its dealings with the public 
in this period.  By examining the approach taken to alcohol health education in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, this article aims to tease out larger issues 
surrounding the nature of public health in Britain and the place of the public 
within it.  The apparent rise of the incidence of chronic disease linked with 
individual behaviour, such as smoking and lung cancer, posed new 
challenges to public health policy makers.  Could the public be persuaded to 
change their behaviour, or did the environment need to be altered?  Should 
public health initiatives target individuals, or the entire population?  How far 
should public health intervene in citizens’ lives?   
                                                        
3 House of Commons, First Report from the Expenditure Committee: 
Preventive Medicine, 1976/77 (London: HMSO, 1977), 35. 
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Attempts to find answers to such questions bedevilled the response to 
alcohol as a public health problem.  To explore and explain these in more 
detail, this article will begin by considering the history of health education and 
responses to alcohol.  Neither health education or alcohol problems were 
‘new’, but the nature of the issue and the ways in which it was responded to 
took on a particular character in the 1970s.  This can be seen in three areas.  
The first concerns a series of alcohol education campaigns designed and 
implemented by the HEC in the North East of England.  The ‘Everybody likes 
a drink. Nobody likes a drunk.’ campaign was the first of three different 
attempts to educate the public about the dangers of alcohol that took place 
between 1974 and 1981.  Looking at each of these campaigns points to an 
evolution in health education’s tactics, targets and techniques, but also to 
problems with these on both a practical and a more fundamental level.  Some 
policy makers and practitioners had doubts about the ability of health 
education to address alcohol problems.  Such reservations are explored in 
more detail in the second area of focus: an analysis of the making of the 
Advisory Council on Alcohol’s (ACA) report on Prevention, published in 1977.4  
The ACA attempted to resolve tension between those who believed that 
health education could prevent the development of alcohol problems and 
those who argued that it was ineffective; that more emphasis should instead 
be placed on increasing the price of alcohol and reducing its availability.  In 
their final report the ACA concluded that such issues demanded wider public 
discussion, and they recommended that a public consultation on alcohol be 
                                                        
4 Advisory Committee on Alcoholism, Report on Prevention (London: H.M.S.O, 
1977). 
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initiated.  The long gestation of the resulting discussion document, Drinking 
Sensibly, forms the third area of focus.  The production of Drinking Sensibly 
between 1977 and 1981 was hindered by considerable inter-departmental 
conflicts.  Officials in the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) 
wanted to endorse the population level approach to dealing with alcohol 
problems, but other departments, such as the Treasury and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), were reluctant to support a policy 
that might result in lowering the tax revenue from alcohol.  As a result, 
Drinking Sensibly rejected population level measures like increasing the duty 
on alcohol, and instead recommended a policy of more health education 
based on the concept of ‘drinking sensibly’.5  
In some ways this could be seen as a victory for the health education 
approach, as efforts to turn Britain into a nation of ‘sensible drinkers’ became 
the cornerstone of alcohol policy.  The ‘sensible drinker’ chimed perfectly with 
elements of the ‘new public health’ focused on getting individuals to take 
responsibility for their own health and limiting the risk that they posed to 
others through preventive actions.6  Yet, as this article will demonstrate, the 
‘sensible drinker’ was just one of the various publics at work within alcohol 
                                                        
5 Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), Prevention and Health. 
Drinking Sensibly (London: H.M.S.O., 1981). 
6 Alan Petersen and Deborah Lupton, The New Public Health: Health and Self 
in the Age of Risk (London: Sage Publications, 1996); Clare Herrick, 
Governing Health and Consumption: Sensible Citizens, Behaviour and the 
City (Bristol: Policy Press, 2011). 
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education and public health more broadly.  Alongside a focus on the individual 
drinker, the drinking habits of the population were also of concern.  So too 
were the rights and responsibilities of citizen-consumers.  These three publics 
– drinkers, the population and citizen-consumers – were often in conflict with 
one another, and though it was drinkers that became the object of alcohol 
policy, the needs of the population, and of citizens-consumers, could not be 
ignored.  
 
Three Publics 
Confusion about the nature of public health and the kinds of publics it involved 
was not a new problem, but it became particularly acute in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.7  As David Cantor has observed, there was no ‘general 
public’, only ways of seeing it.  Cantor suggests that up until the 1930s, the 
public were regarded as a largely undifferentiated mass, but after this period 
the public began to fragment. The establishment of the National Health 
Service, the development of consumerism, and the application of 
epidemiological categories began to break up the general public into different 
groups.  By the 1970s, Cantor contends, ‘the notion of an undifferentiated 
public was much harder to sustain, and differences, which might once have 
                                                        
7 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Public Health’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of Medicine, ed. by Mark Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
411–28 (417); Jane E. Lewis, What Price Community Medicine?: The 
Philosophy, Practice and Politics of Public Health Since 1919 (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 5. 
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been portrayed as variations within the mass general public, came to be 
marks of different publics.’8  The nature of these various publics and their 
place within post-war public health requires further exploration, but by pointing 
to three distinct but overlapping publics – the individual drinker; the population 
and the citizen-consumer – this article will begin to open up the categories of 
the public and public health to analysis.9   
On the surface, individual drinkers would seem like the easiest group to 
define – anyone who consumed alcohol was a ‘drinker’ – but even here there 
were considerable variations.  How much and how frequently an individual 
drank, his or her relationship to alcohol, and the consequences of alcohol use 
for that individual and for society all played a part in shaping different 
categories of drinker.  ‘Alcoholics’, ‘problem drinkers’, ‘heavy drinkers’ and 
‘alcohol misusers’ had long been of interest to both the state and medical 
professionals, but in the 1960s and 1970s the ‘moderate’ or ‘sensible’ drinker 
also became an object of concern.  This was related to two developments.  
Firstly, individual behaviour was increasingly seen as a cause of public health 
problems.  As will be discussed in greater detail below, the linking of 
behaviours such as smoking to diseases like lung cancer meant that 
individuals and their lifestyles were of concern to public health.  Secondly, the 
                                                        
8 David Cantor, ‘Representing “the Public”: Medicine, Charity and the Public 
Sphere in Twentieth Century Britain’, in Medicine, Health and the Public 
Sphere in Britain: 1600-2000, ed. by Sturdy, Steve (London: Routledge, 2002), 
145–68 (160). 
9 See http://placingthepublic.lshtm.ac.uk.  Accessed 1.06.16.   
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application of epidemiology to this new category of behaviour-related 
conditions broadened the scope of public health to encompass the whole 
population as well as ‘risky’ individuals.  Focus shifted from ‘problem’ drinkers 
of one sort or another to include all drinkers.10 
This interest in the epidemiology of alcohol use and other lifestyle 
issues conjured another public into being: the population.  This was not, of 
course, a new concept – the accumulation of data about the populace was a 
crucial part of modern state formation – but post-war epidemiology 
constructed the population and its relationship to the individual and the 
environment in ways that had a profound impact on the development of public 
health policy and practice.  A key figure in British public health during this 
period, the epidemiologist Jerry Morris, defined epidemiology as ‘the study of 
health and disease of populations and of groups in relation to their 
environment and their ways of living.’11  Individuals, their behaviour and their 
environment, were both part of the population and distinct from it.  As Nancy 
                                                        
10 A key text here was Kettil Bruun et al, Alcohol Control Policies in Public 
Health Perspective (The Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies : New 
Brunswick, N.J. : distributors, Rutgers University Center of Alcohol Studies, 
1975). 
11 J. N. Morris, Uses of Epidemiology (Edinburgh & London: E&S Livingstone 
Ltd., 1957), 16. 
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Krieger notes, ‘individual’ and ‘population’ were not antonyms.12  Nonetheless, 
a population orientated view of public health problems could result in a 
change of emphasis and thus a change of policy.  A population level approach 
to alcohol problems could be found in a thesis first put forward in 1956 by the 
French demographer Sully Ledermann.13  Ledermann argued that the level of 
alcohol consumption within a population was related to the extent of alcohol 
problems within that population.  As the total amount of alcohol consumed 
increased, so too did the number of individuals with alcohol problems.  
Reducing the amount of alcohol consumed by everyone, whether a problem 
drinker or not, would result in better health outcomes overall.  This thesis, as 
we shall see, was controversial, but the population level approach to public 
health problems was endorsed and further developed by leading 
epidemiologists, like Geoffrey Rose.14  Moreover, a population view of alcohol 
‘disabilities’, one that stressed the environment as well as individual 
                                                        
12 Nancy Krieger, ‘Who and What Is a “Population”? Historical Debates, 
Current Controversies, and Implications for Understanding “Population Health” 
and Rectifying Health Inequities’, Milbank Quarterly, 90.4 (2012), 634–81. 
13 Betsy Thom, Dealing with Drink: Alcohol and Social Policy in Contemporary 
England (London ; New York: Free Association Books, 1999), 109–111. 
14 Geoffrey Rose, ‘Sick Individuals and Sick Populations’, International 
Journal of Epidemiology, 14.1 (1985), 32–38; Geoffrey Rose, The Strategy of 
Preventive Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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responsibility, found support at the global level, especially at the World Health 
Organisation.15  
 A central reason why the Ledermann thesis was unpopular within 
sections of the UK government was because it implied that in order to reduce 
consumption, alcohol should become harder and/or more expensive to obtain.  
This approach seemed to conflict with the interests of a third public: citizen-
consumers.  A relationship between citizenship and consumption had existed 
since at least the nineteenth century, but in the second half of the twentieth 
century citizen and consumer identities moved even closer together.16  
Consumerist principles such as the ability to complain and the right to 
information found their way into public services like housing and health care.  
Facilitating the power of citizen-consumer’s to make use of high quality goods 
and services became paramount.  Viewed in this light, any restrictions on a 
drinker’s ability to consume alcohol were not only a limitation to traditional 
ideas about individual liberty, but also placed unacceptable restraints on 
consumption.  Making alcohol more expensive or increasing restrictions on its 
sale was antithetical to a trend that encouraged the provision of high quality 
                                                        
15 Robin Room, ‘The World Health Organization and Alcohol Control’, British 
Journal of Addiction, 79 (1984), 85–92. 
16 See, for example, Frank Trentmann, ‘Citizenship and consumption’, Journal 
of Consumer Culture (2007) 7(2), 147-158; Matthew Hilton and Martin 
Daunton, ‘Material politics: an introduction’ in Martin Daunton and Matthew 
Hilton (eds) The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in 
Europe and America (Oxford: Berg, 2001), 1-32. 
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inexpensive goods and services.  Of course, a key role for the state was to 
regulate consumption and make sure that products could be consumed safely, 
and alcohol undoubtedly posed dangers to individual and collective health.  
But instead of increasing restrictions, a more acceptable way to curb alcohol 
use was to appeal to the rationality of the citizen-consumer, to provide 
information and education in order to allow him or her to consume alcohol 
sensibly. Health education offered a way to alert the public to the risks posed 
by alcohol without restricting the choices of citizen-consumers. 
 
Health Education: A Brief History  
Attempts to educate the public about dangers to health and ways to 
ameliorate these had long been part of public health.17  Health education, 
however, assumed new importance in the wake of the bacteriological 
revolution at the end of the nineteenth century, as the behaviour of individuals, 
as well as the environment, became crucial to understandings of how disease 
spread.18  As a result, in the early twentieth century, public health policy 
makers and practitioners in Britain made use of health education to attempt to 
                                                        
17 On pre-nineteenth century health education see George Rosen, A History 
of Public Health, expanded edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 9, 34–36, 98–100. 
18 Dorothy Porter, Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health 
from Ancient to Modern Times (London: Routledge, 1999); David Armstrong, 
Political Anatomy of the Body: Medical Knowledge in Britain in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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inculcate personal hygiene and preventive habits amongst the population.  
Such efforts were also aimed at promoting morality and good citizenship.19  
Health was thus an individual responsibility and a public duty.20  At the local 
level, Medical Officers of Health carried out health education work including 
lectures, exhibitions, health weeks and the creation of visual material such as 
posters and leaflets.21  At the national level, the Central Council for Health 
Education (CCHE) was established in 1927 to attempt to coordinate the field.  
The CCHE was funded by subscriptions from local authorities, not central 
government, and the Council lacked leadership for much of its life.22 
                                                        
19 John Welshman, ‘“Bringing Beauty and Brightness to the Back Streets”: 
Health Education and Public Health in England and Wales, 1890-1940’, 
Health Education Journal, 56.2 (1997), 199–209. 
20 Jane Seymour, ‘Not Rights but Reciprocal Responsibility: The Rhetoric of 
State Health Provision in Early Twentieth-Century Britain’, in Assembling 
Health Rights in Global Context: Genealogies and Anthropologies (Abingdon, 
Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013), 23–41. 
21 Martin Gorsky, ‘Local Leadership in Public Health: The Role of the Medical 
Officer of Health in Britain, 1872-1974’, Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, 61.6 (2007), 468–72; John Welshman, ‘The Medical 
Officer of Health in England and Wales, 1900-1974: Watchdog or Lapdog?’, 
Journal of Public Health Medicine, 19.4 (1997), 443–50. 
22 Max Blythe, ‘A History of the Central Council for Health Education, 1927-
1968’ (unpublished DPhil, University of Oxford, Green College, 1987). 
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 By the mid twentieth century, however, there were signs of a change of 
direction for health education.  In part, this was a response to shifting patterns 
of morbidity and mortality.  As infectious disease in the West declined, chronic 
conditions, often linked to individual behaviour, appeared to increase.23  
Behaviour was regarded as a cause of disease, not just a way of spreading it.  
This warranted a new approach within health education.  One of the first 
areas where such a move can be observed is around smoking and cancer.24  
In the early 1950s, the work of Austin Bradford Hill and Richard Doll 
established a causal link between smoking and lung cancer.  The obvious 
way to reduce the incidence of lung cancer was to encourage individuals to 
stop smoking.  Although some health educators saw the public as irrational 
and fearful, especially with respect to cancer, others saw the public as 
reasonable and educable.25  In the 1950s, health education messages around 
smoking tended to favour the latter approach, and appealed to the smoker as 
a rational individual, presenting him (at this point messages were directed 
                                                        
23 For a more critical account of this transition, see George Weisz, Chronic 
Disease in the Twentieth Century: A History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014); David Armstrong, ‘Chronic Illness: A Revisionist 
Account’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 36.1 (2014), 15–27. 
24 Virginia Berridge, Marketing Health: Smoking and the Discourse of Public 
Health in Britain, 1945-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 Elizabeth Toon, ‘“Cancer as the General Population Knows It”: Knowledge, 
Fear, and Lay Education in 1950s Britain’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 
81.1 (2007). 
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largely at men) with information about the potential dangers of smoking, but 
leaving it up to him to decide what to do.26  
 By the 1960s, a further shift was detectable as the list of behaviours 
that could cause ill health began to grow.  In 1964, the Central and Scottish 
Health Services Councils published a report on health education.  Named 
after its chairman, Lord Cohen, the Cohen report argued that ‘Health 
education must do more than provide information.  It must also seek to 
influence people to act on that advice and information given’.27  The report 
recommended moving away from what it termed ‘specific action campaigns’, 
such as educating the public about vaccination, and towards areas of ‘self-
discipline’, such as smoking, overeating and exercise.  The Cohen report also 
suggested a change of tactics, recommending that more use be made of the 
mass media, and called for the establishment of ‘a strong central board’ to 
oversee health education.  The government accepted the Cohen report’s 
recommendations, and in 1968 the Health Education Council was established.  
The HEC took over the CCHE’s functions, but instead of being funded by local 
authorities, financial support came from central government, although 
technically the Council was independent of its supporting department, the 
                                                        
26 Virginia Berridge and Kelly Loughlin, ‘Smoking and the New Health 
Education in Britain 1950s-1970s’, American Journal of Public Health, 95.6 
(2005), 956–64. 
27 Central Health Services Council and Scottish Health Services Council, 
Health Education (London: HMSO, 1964), 9. 
 15 
DHSS.28  The HEC decided that its ‘first concern should be with the 
prevention of common diseases which impair working capacity, cause 
distressing disability and premature death.’29  This included conditions related 
to behaviours like smoking and alcohol consumption. 
 Individual behaviour also figured centrally in a series of major reports 
on the state of public health and what to do about it.  In 1976, a DHSS booklet 
entitled, Prevention and Health: Everybody’s Business, asserted that ‘We as a 
society are becoming increasingly aware of how much depends on the 
attitude and actions of the individual about his health.  Prevention today is 
everybody’s business.’30  Emphasis was placed on preventing the 
development of disease in order to eliminate unnecessary suffering and 
reduce the financial burden of ill health.  Health Minister David Ennals told the 
Royal Society of Health that ‘The types of change that are required in 
individual behaviour and habits in relation, for example, to smoking, drinking, 
eating and driving, cannot be brought about by Government action alone.  To 
achieve significant and lasting changes in attitudes and life-style we must look 
                                                        
28 Ian Sutherland, Health Education - Half a Policy, 1968-86: Rise and Fall of 
the Health Education Council (Cambridge: NEC Publications, 1987). 
29 The National Archives (hereafter TNA) FP 1/1, The Health Education 
Council – Questions for the Health Education Council.  Submission by the 
Director General for Consideration on 20 March 1973. Annex A: Extract from 
memorandum dated January 1969: Areas of Concern and Action. 
30 DHSS, Prevention and Health: Everybody’s Business. A Reassessment of 
Public and Personal Health (London: H.M.S.O, 1976), 7. 
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increasingly to health education.’31  Health education was to have a central 
place in the new, preventive approach.  The government’s 1977 report, 
Prevention and Health, stated that ‘Health education is one of the most 
important aspects of preventive medicine.  It can contribute significantly to the 
public’s understanding of ill-health and its prevention and of the value of 
adopting healthy living habits.’32   
Although individually focused health education designed to encourage 
personal prevention was the dominant method for dealing with public health 
problems in 1970s Britain, there were signs of an alternative approach in the 
making.  The social, economic and environmental determinants of health 
began to attract increased attention, especially at the global level through the 
World Health Organisation.33  By the 1980s, the notion of ‘health promotion’ 
began to replace that of ‘health education’.34  Health promotion was about 
developing ‘positive health’ – health as more than the absence of disease – 
and preventing illness rather than simply treating it.  More traditional health 
education tactics, such as informing people about particular conditions and 
                                                        
31 TNA MH 154/693, Press release: Preventive health services can save 
nation money: minister.  Quality of life may also improve. 3 November, 1976. 
32 Cmnd 7047, Prevention and Health (London: H.M.S.O, 1977), 7. 
33 Ilona Kickbusch, ‘The Contribution of the World Health Organization to a 
New Public Health and Health Promotion’, American Journal of Public Health, 
93.3 (2003), 383–88. 
34 Alex Mold and Virginia Berridge, ‘The History of Health Promotion’, in 
Health Promotion Theory (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2013), 3–19. 
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ways to prevent them, could be part of health promotion, but health promotion 
also encompassed a range of other techniques including working with 
communities to develop healthy environments.35  In the UK, such an approach 
manifested itself in various ways.  There were attempts to develop a specialist 
training programme for health promoters and also efforts to underscore the 
relationship between poverty and ill health.36   
Some saw the appearance of health promotion as part of a ‘new public 
health’ that emphasised both individual behaviour and structural factors as the 
leading causes of ill health. John Ashton (later President of the Faculty of 
Public Health) and health promoter Howard Seymour argued that ‘the New 
Public Health is an approach which brings together environmental change and 
personal preventive measures…Many contemporary health problems are 
therefore seen as being social rather than solely individual problems’.37  Yet, 
the meaning of the new public health was (and continues to be) a ‘moving 
                                                        
35 Deborah Lupton, The Imperative of Health: Public Health and the 
Regulated Body (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995), 
49–54. 
36 Peter Duncan, ‘Failing to Professionalise, Struggling to Specialise: The 
Rise and Fall of Health Promotion as a Putative Specialism in England, 1980–
2000’, Medical History, 57.03 (2013), 377–96; Virginia Berridge and Stuart 
Blume, Poor Health: Social Inequality Before and After the Black Report 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
37 John Ashton and Howard Seymour, The New Public Health: The Liverpool 
Experience (Open University Press, 1988), 21. 
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target’.38  When the ‘new public health’ came into being and precisely what 
was ‘new’ about it has prompted much debate.  Dorothy Porter contends that 
the origins of the new public health can be traced to the late 1950s, rooted in 
social medicine and especially the work of Jerry Morris.39  In contrast, Niyi 
Awofeso suggests that the era of the new public health did not really begin 
until the 1990s.40  Other critics have taken issue with the nature of the new 
public health itself.  Structural approaches did not always sit easily alongside 
efforts aimed at getting people to change their behaviour.  Sociologists such 
as Alan Petersen, Deborah Lupton and David Armstrong saw the new public 
health as a way of disciplining individuals, of increasing surveillance and 
blaming victim’s for their plight.41  Tensions between and within these 
meanings of the new public health can be observed in differing approaches to 
health education, and especially in efforts to deal with alcohol as a public 
health problem.    
 
                                                        
38 Theodore Tulchinsky and Elena Varavikova, ‘What Is the “New Public 
Health”?’, Public Health Reviews, 32.1 (2010), 25–53. 
39 Dorothy Porter, ‘Calculating Health and Social Change: An Essay on Jerry 
Morris and Late-Modernist Epidemiology’, International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 36.6 (2007), 1180–84. 
40 Niyi Awofeso, ‘What’s New About the “New Public Health”?’, American 
Journal of Public Health, 94.5 (2004), 705–9. 
41 Petersen and Lupton; David Armstrong, ‘Public Health Spaces and the 
Fabrication of Identity’, Sociology, 27.3 (1993), 393–410. 
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Alcohol: a Public Health Problem? 
The consumption of alcoholic beverages and their affects on drinkers was not 
a new area of governmental concern in the 1970s.  Alcohol had posed 
problems in terms of public order, danger to health and morality for centuries.  
During the nineteenth century, the habitual consumption of alcohol came to be 
seen as the disease of ‘alcoholism’, comprising both medical and moral 
elements.42  There were public health dimensions to the alcohol issue, 
especially around the impact drinking had on industrial production, but drink 
was not seen as a public health problem.  The temperance movement, for 
instance, intersected rarely with those pressing for sanitarian reform.43  
Alcohol consumption and alcohol problems attracted relatively little attention 
in the early decades of the twentieth century.  It was not until the 1950s, when 
there was an apparent rise in the number of alcoholics, that the disease-
based view of alcoholism was ‘re-discovered’, prompting the establishment of 
dedicated treatment units for individuals with alcohol problems.44   
 A wider appreciation of the difficulties that alcohol could cause began 
to emerge in the 1960s.  Initially, the focus was on drink driving.  Measures 
                                                        
42 Mariana Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of 
Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
43 Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in 
England 1815-1872, 2nd edn (Keele: Keele University Press, 1994). 
44 Thom; Betsy Thom and Virginia Berridge, ‘“Special Units for Common 
Problems”: The Birth of Alcohol Treatment Units in England’, Social History of 
Medicine, 8.1 (1995), 75–93. 
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such as the introduction of the breathalyser in 1967 were designed to protect 
the public from intoxicated drivers and reduce the number of motor vehicle 
accidents.45  Towards the end of the decade, a more distinct public health 
view of alcohol problems started to appear.  This was prompted by a marked 
growth in alcohol consumption during the 1960s and 1970s, and with it an 
increase in alcohol-related illnesses such as cirrhosis of the liver.46  Alcohol 
consumption almost doubled between 1950 and the mid 1970s, rising from 
5.2 litres of pure alcohol per person to 9.3 litres.47  Deaths from liver cirrhosis 
increased from just over 20 per million in 1950 to more than 40 per million by 
1970.48  Alcohol clearly posed a danger to public health, but it was not the 
established authorities and institutions within public health policy making and 
practice that pushed alcohol on to the public health agenda.  Instead, a 
distinct ‘alcohol policy network’, made up of doctors and researchers who 
specialised in alcohol and addictions, voluntary organisations and sympathetic 
civil servants, were instrumental in getting the government to take alcohol 
                                                        
45 Bill Luckin, ‘A Kind of Consensus on the Roads? Drink Driving Policy in 
Britain 1945–1970’, Twentieth Century British History, 21.3 (2010), 350–74; 
Bill Luckin, ‘Anti-Drink Driving Reform in Britain, C. 1920–80’, Addiction, 105.9 
(2010), 1538–44. 
46 James Nicholls, The Politics of Alcohol (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2009), 204. 
47 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Alcohol: Our Favourite Drug (London: 
Tavistock, 1986), 108. 
48 Royal College of Physicians, A Great and Growing Evil: The Medical 
Consequences of Alcohol Abuse (London: Tavistock, 1987), 24. 
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issues seriously.49  This alcohol policy network was able to take the lead in 
defining alcohol as a public health issue because the traditional bastions of 
public health practice and policy making were in disarray in this period.  The 
key public health official, the Medical Officer of Health (MOH), had undergone 
a gradual diminution in status following the establishment of the NHS.50  The 
position of MOH was scrapped altogether when public health services moved 
out of local government following the reorganisation of the health service in 
1973, although it was later replaced with the Director of Public Health role 
when public health ‘returned’ to local government in 2012.51  Academic public 
health was also undergoing significant change, most notably around the uses 
of epidemiology to demonstrate causal links between behaviour and 
disease.52 
Indeed, it was an epidemiological view of alcohol consumption that 
helped redefine alcohol as a public health issue.  Key members of the British 
alcohol policy network championed the Ledermann thesis and asserted that 
the extent of alcohol problems was related to the total level of alcohol 
consumption within the population.  This epidemiological approach to alcohol 
prompted a series of government reports and investigations by medical 
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professional bodies throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As will be 
discussed in greater detail below, there was some support for the idea that tax 
should be used to increase the price of alcohol (or at least not let it decline 
further in real terms) so as to decrease population-level consumption, and 
therefore alcohol related harms.  Such an approach was controversial: a 
report produced by a government think tank that had suggested taxation be 
used to control the price of drink was suppressed.53  The government was 
reluctant to use tax policy in this way, and were fearful of the economic impact 
such measures would have on the drinks industry, tax revenue, and jobs.  
 Nonetheless, something needed to be done about alcohol problems.  
The apparent solution was to focus on health education.  Here was something 
that all parties, including health professionals, government and the alcohol 
industry, could agree on.  Alcohol health education was, according to Rob 
Baggott, an ‘island of consensus’.54  Yet, this ‘island of consensus’ was really 
a mirage.  A close examination of the development of alcohol education in the 
1970s demonstrates that there was little unity about the tactics to be used or 
their effectiveness.  This casts doubt not only over alcohol education, but also 
over health education in general and the nature of the relationship between 
public health and the public.     
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The HEC’s North East Campaigns on Alcohol Education, 1974-81 
In the early 1970s, the newly established HEC decided to mount a health 
education campaign on alcohol.  Such a move can be explained by the 
growing concern about alcohol problems within government, but was also 
rooted in the HEC’s view of public health and its role in promoting it.  The 
HEC saw health as ‘more than bodily fitness – that ultimately our concern was 
to help people live in a state of harmony with themselves and with the 
community as a whole.’55  Alcohol problems fitted within this approach.  In 
November 1973, the HEC agreed to run a pilot anti-alcohol campaign in the 
North East of England.56  The Council was tasked with delivering health 
education nationally and locally, although most of their work at the local level 
was restricted to providing information, leaflets and guidance to local 
authorities.57  The North East campaigns on alcohol where somewhat 
different: they were intended to test the approach before rolling the 
programme out to other regions.   
Why the North East region was chosen for the pilot is unclear.  The fact 
that the area had the highest alcohol consumption levels for men in the UK 
was later used to justify selection, although this irritated local service workers 
who felt that problems in the North East were no worse than anywhere else in 
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the country.58  The selected region was also coterminous with the boundaries 
of the Area Health Authority and the Tyne Tees television area, something 
that made the distribution of TV advertisements easier.  The HEC’s alcohol 
education programme in the North East was divided into three distinct phases.  
The first was in 1974; the second between 1977 and 1979; and the final 
phase occurred in 1981.  Each campaign adopted a different approach, and 
the difficulties encountered reveal varied aspects of the problems 
underpinning alcohol health education.   
 
1) ‘Everybody likes a drink.  Nobody likes a drunk.’, 1974 
The first stage of the HEC’s anti-alcohol programme began in October 1974.  
It aimed to: firstly, increase professional awareness of alcohol problems; and 
secondly, to establish the feasibility of health education about alcohol 
problems.59  The campaign cost £88,000, with £60,000 being spent on TV, 
press and poster advertisements.60  The campaign material was designed by 
the London-based advertising agency, Saatchi and Saatchi.  The agency was 
one of the first to fully appreciate the value of TV advertisements for reaching 
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a large audience and was well known for their imaginative approach.61  The 
HEC had used Saatchi and Saatchi previously to create anti-smoking material, 
including a controversial image of a naked, pregnant woman smoking.62   
The advertisements that the agency designed for the anti-alcohol 
campaign were no less provocative.  Based around the tagline ‘Everybody 
likes a drink. Nobody likes a drunk.’ the advertisements attempted to convey 
some of the dangers of heavy drinking; the signs and symptoms that were 
indicative of problems due to heavy drinking; and where to get help.63  The 
posters used for the campaign were stark and simple, with no visual imagery 
beyond the slogan itself, and a further exhortation to ‘Drink in moderation’ and 
‘Not let alcohol go to your head.’  The HEC felt that the central slogan ‘would 
be a powerful and positive message to adopt, without exposing the Council to 
accusations of being killjoys’.64  Yet, not everyone agreed.  Local psychiatrist 
Anthony Thorley argued that the slogan was ‘criticised and misunderstood by 
many North-easterners.  Not everybody does like a drink.  People are not all 
agreed as to what a “drunk” is.  One man’s “sensible drinking” is another 
man’s stupidity.’65  The Medical Council on Alcoholism and the Alcohol 
                                                        
61 Alison Fendley, Saatchi & Saatchi: The Inside Story (Skyhorse Publishing, 
Inc., 2011). 
62 Berridge and Loughlin. 
63 Cust. 
64 Budd, Gray and McCron, 31. 
65 Thorley, 261. 
 26 
Education Centre also objected to the tag line, and would have preferred that 
it read ‘Almost everybody likes a drink’.66  
 
Figure 1: ‘Everybody likes a drink. Nobody likes a drunk’.  Saatchi & Saatchi 
for the Health Education Council, 1974. 
 
Criticism of the campaign went beyond its tagline.  The campaign was 
intended to be a piece of primary prevention – that is it was designed to stop 
alcohol problems from developing.  Yet, the focus of the advertisements, and 
even the way that the agency and the HEC described the campaign, 
suggested that the target group was those already experiencing alcohol 
problems, such as alcoholics and heavy drinkers, rather than the general 
population.  The HEC tended to refer to their efforts as the ‘anti-alcoholism 
campaign’, and saw the fact that over 900 people contacted treatment 
services in the wake of the campaign as a sign of its success.67  On the 
ground in the North East, local alcohol agency workers were less convinced.  
Services were overwhelmed and they lacked the capacity to assist everyone 
who came forward for help.68  An evaluation of the campaign suggested that 
whilst penetration was high – most people interviewed recalled seeing the 
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advertisements on TV or in the newspapers – there was little lasting change in 
attitudes towards drinking or drinking behaviour.69 
 
2) ‘It’s always the boozer who’s the loser’, 1977-79 
The HEC took on board some of the criticisms made of the 1974 campaign 
when designing a second phase, which ran between 1977 and 1979.  This 
stage of the campaign had similar aims as before, and initially utilised the 
same material, but later developed new resources under the slogan ‘It’s 
always the boozer who’s the loser.’  Fresh visual and audio-visual material 
was commissioned by the HEC, who again made use of Saatchi and Saatchi.  
The agency produced ‘playlets’ which were shown on Tyne Tees TV and in 
local cinemas.  These advertisements were criticised by local agencies, which 
regarded them as still too focused on alcoholics rather than on everyday 
drinkers.  Moreover, the campaign betrayed a lack of understanding of the 
local population.  Voices of the actors in the advertisements had Yorkshire 
accents rather than those of people from the North East, and the content of 
the commercials was too geared to a ‘middle class view of life’.70  Thorley 
argued that one of the posters, which featured a picture of manicured female 
hand reaching for a bottle of vodka, was a ‘jet-set’ image that did not resonate 
in the North East.  Another poster focused on the effect that alcohol could 
have on men’s sexual performance.  Making use of the universal symbol for 
male, the poster suggested that having too much to drink could result in 
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erectile dysfunction, or ‘brewer’s droop’.  The poster won an advertising prize, 
but not everyone viewing the poster understood what the symbols meant.71  
Thorley suggested that ‘in the North-east the vast majority of people had no 
idea at all what the symbols represented.  One wit even queried whether it 
represented a crashed Volvo car!’72   
 
Figure 2: ‘If you drink too much there’s one part that every beer can reach’, 
Saatchi and Saatchi for the Health Education Council, 1979. 
 
Another poster featured an image of a crying child.  Her dirty, bruised face 
was streaked with tears, and the strapline read: ‘Eight pints of beer and four 
large whiskies a day aren’t doing her any good.’  Once again, Thorley felt that 
the image was misunderstood, and though the poster ‘became well known 
throughout the region’ a ‘minority thought it was the girl who had been 
drinking!’73 
 
Figure 3: ‘Eight pints of beer and four double whiskies a day aren’t doing her 
any good’. Saatchi & Saatchi for the Health Education Council, 1981. 
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Misunderstood or not, these posters indicated a change of tactics and focus.  
Both posters attempted to appeal to the emotions of the viewer in order to 
provoke reflection on the amount of alcohol s/he consumed.  The ‘brewer’s 
droop’ poster made use of humour to encourage the viewer to think about the 
consequences of heavy drinking for themselves and for their sexual partner.  
The ‘battered child’ poster focused on the damage alcohol could cause to an 
‘innocent victim’, a trope found in nineteenth century temperance material and 
also within more contemporary public health campaigns, such as those 
around smoking.74  The posters drew attention to the wider consequences of 
alcohol consumption beyond those impacting upon the individual drinker 
themselves, thus emphasising the social dimension to the alcohol problem, 
rather than purely the medical one.  This was reinforced by the impression 
that the posters appeared to be aimed at ordinary (albeit ‘heavy’ or 
‘excessive’) drinkers rather than alcoholics.   
 The second phase of the campaign came to an end in 1979.  
According to an evaluation of the campaign, the HEC said that they decided 
to abandon their efforts due to lack of action and co-ordination on the ground, 
something denied by those in the North East.75  Thorley contended that ‘By 
1979 it was clear that the media work, now costing almost half a million 
pounds, was ineffective and increasingly embarrassing to all concerned.’76  
For their part, Saatchi and Saatchi were also dissatisfied with the campaign, 
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as they found the central brief, to focus on encouraging moderation in drinking, 
was a difficult task to fulfil.77  Indeed, the campaign material gave little 
indication as to what ‘moderate’ drinking consisted of.  The ‘battered child’ 
poster did appear to suggest that eight pints of beer and four large whiskies a 
day was ‘too much’, but the setting of limits to alcohol consumption was to 
form a more central part of the campaign’s third phase, in 1981. 
 
3) ‘Why spoil a good thing?’, 1981 
The final stage of the HEC’s anti-alcohol campaign in the North East was 
framed around a desire to promote ‘moderate drinking’.  Those involved in 
devising the campaign wanted it to focus on heightening awareness of alcohol 
problems rather than cutting the consumption of alcohol per se.78  The HEC 
dropped Saatchi and Saatchi, and instead made use of a Newcastle-based 
advertising agency, Redlands.  The agency devised new campaign materials 
featuring local TV presenter and botanist, David Bellamy.  Bellamy was 
chosen by Redlands because they felt that he would be seen by the public as 
intelligent and honest, but also able to connect with the intended audience as 
he was from the North East and a drinker himself.79  The advertisements 
offered guidance on how much alcohol was ‘too much’ (five pints of beer or 
more) and also suggested a level of moderate consumption as being 
‘something like two or three pints two or three times a week.’  Indeed, the 
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benefits of moderate alcohol consumption were tacitly acknowledged by the 
campaign’s tagline ‘Why spoil a good thing?’.   
 
Figure 4: ‘If you're drinking five pints of beer or more everyday…’ Redlands 
for the Health Education Council, 1981 
 
Some saw the campaign’s issuing of clear guidance on levels of alcohol 
consumption as more informative and less moralising than previous 
messages.80  The setting of drinking limits was, however, controversial.  
There was little agreement amongst experts about what a ‘safe’ level of 
drinking consisted of.  In their 1979 report the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
suggested that four pints, four double whiskies or one bottle of wine a day 
‘constitute reasonable guidelines of the upper limit of drinking’.81  Yet, other 
experts were concerned that setting an upper limit would encourage people to 
drink up to that level in the belief that their behaviour could do no harm.82 
Devising guidance around safe alcohol consumption limits became a feature 
of alcohol policy in the mid 1980s, but this campaign was one of the first to 
attempt to communicate information about ‘sensible drinking’ to the wider 
public.  
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 A survey conducted in the North East in the wake of the ‘Bellamy 
campaign’ suggested that the core message around moderate drinking did get 
through to the local population.  More than two thirds of those interviewed 
recalled the campaign, and all but four of the 750 respondents were able to 
remember something relevant when questioned about the main message of 
the campaign.  When asked if the campaign had changed their behaviour, 
12.7% claimed that it had, but only three people said that they had actually 
tried to drink less.83  As an evaluation of the campaign pointed out, it had not 
been designed to change behaviour, and based on its original goal of raising 
public awareness about moderate alcohol consumption, the campaign could 
be judged a modest success.84  However, the HEC’s paymasters, the DHSS, 
were less convinced.  The department and its ministers were aware that 
changing behaviour was challenging and time consuming.  In 1981, the 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Patrick Jenkin, told a meeting of the 
National Council on Alcoholism that ‘It is difficult to modify social attitudes and 
difficult to measure what, if anything, has been achieved.  Health education is 
a long haul.’  But he also remarked that ‘At a time when money is clearly 
limited, Ministers and all concerned need to be convinced that the available 
resources will be used to good effect.’85  The HEC were under pressure to 
demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of their work, but they were unsure that 
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alcohol health education would result in reduced alcohol consumption, at least 
directly.  The Council’s alcohol programme strategy for 1982-3 argued that 
many forces influenced alcohol consumption, and as a result ‘health 
education by itself [original emphasis] has only a limited ability to reduce it.’  
Other measures, such as greater control of alcohol, and aiming to reduce per 
capita consumption, also had a part to play in dealing with alcohol related 
harm.86  
Taken together, the three phases of the HEC’s alcohol education 
campaign in the North East points to an evolution in targets, techniques and 
tactics.  In the first phase of the campaign, the target group seemed to be 
alcoholics, or the ‘drunk’.  In the second phase, the target group was the 
‘boozer’ or the ‘heavy drinker’.  In the final phase, it appeared that a wider 
drinking public was the target, with the desire to promote ‘sensible’ or 
‘moderate’ drinking.  The techniques also altered over time, with humour and 
emotional entreaties giving way to a more ‘rational’ approach, appealing to the 
drinker as a ‘sensible’ individual able to moderate their behaviour.  Such 
changing techniques spoke also to changing tactics, with a more specific 
sense of the kinds of behaviour that should be encouraged or discouraged 
emerging by the end of the period.  These shifts reflected broader 
developments at the policy level that will be explored in the remainder of the 
article, but at the same time there was also a lack of confidence about health 
education itself.  Significant doubts were expressed, not least by the HEC, 
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about the ability of health education to shrink alcohol consumption.  Other 
means, such as reducing drinking at the population level, seemed to offer an 
alternative solution.   
 
The report of Advisory Committee on Alcoholism on Prevention, 1975-77 
The best way to prevent the development of alcohol problems, including the 
role of population level measures and health education, was examined by a 
number of expert committees in the 1970s.  A key report was produced by the 
Advisory Committee on Alcoholism (ACA), which was established in 1975 to 
advise the government on the provision of services relating to alcoholism.  
According to Betsy Thom, their terms of reference were vague, and the 
committee were able to interpret their brief quite widely, examining not only 
treatment services, but also the prevention of alcohol problems.87  As a result, 
the ACA were interested not only in alcoholics and heavy drinkers, but also 
those who might develop drinking problems, and the consumption of alcohol 
within the population more broadly.  In their report the ACA argued that ‘we 
have to consider not only the affected individual, those who come into contact 
with him, and vulnerable groups, but also deep rooted attitudes, assumptions 
and traditions which blind people to the wide range of problems caused by 
alcohol misuse.’88   
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The ACA’s expansive interpretation of the potential damage that 
alcohol could cause led it towards a broad understanding of the ways in which 
such problems could be prevented.  The committee’s decision to focus on 
prevention was, however, ‘against the Chairman’s wishes and our [the 
DHSS’s] advice’.  The DHSS were well aware that the ACA was likely to stray 
in to areas that were the concern of other government departments, such as 
MAFF, which they saw as ‘the sponsoring department for the drinks 
industry’.89  A particular flash point was the Ledermann thesis and the notion 
that introducing measures to decrease alcohol consumption throughout the 
population could reduce drink problems.  At the ACA’s first meeting they 
accepted Ledermann’s arguments, stating that ‘the available facts pointed 
strongly towards the need for a reduction in per capita consumption of alcohol 
as one of the objectives of any preventive strategy.’  But, at the same time, 
the committee were also aware of the potential political and social 
consequences of such an approach.  They noted that ‘Increasing the price of 
alcohol in real terms to a point where consumption was substantially affected 
would be difficult politically and might cause secondary poverty’.90  As a result, 
the committee did not suggest any changes to fiscal controls or the licensing 
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laws; instead they recommended that ‘alcohol should not be allowed to 
become cheaper in real terms’.91 
Alongside this moderate form of price control, the committee proposed 
that more effort be put in to health education.  In their final report the ACA 
recommended that ‘Health education designed to alert people to the dangers 
of alcohol and to discourage excessive drinking should be encouraged and 
expanded.’92  In the discussions leading up to the publication of the report, 
however, health education had occupied a more controversial position.  The 
psychiatrist and addiction researcher Griffith Edwards ‘had considerable 
reservations about any campaign which attempted to change people’s 
behaviour.’  Edwards was in favour of the introduction of greater controls on 
the price and availability of alcohol, and he suggested that ‘any campaign 
which was mounted should attempt to educate the public about the need for 
controls over the availability of alcohol as a means of preventing 
alcoholism.’93  Not everyone on the committee agreed, and at a later meeting 
(where Edwards was absent) they began to move towards an approach that 
emphasised ‘safe’ or ‘healthy’ drinking.94  The committee expressed some 
doubt about the ‘value of referring to “healthy drinking” or “safe drinking 
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levels”’ as ‘the message conveyed was so complex that it seemed likely to be 
misunderstood.’95  Nonetheless, the ACA did touch on the issue in their report, 
suggesting that there was a need to ‘define a level of heavy drinking and to 
discourage drinking above that level.’  They even made a tentative suggestion 
as to what this level should consist of, noting that a daily intake of 15cl of 
ethanol, equivalent to about half a bottle of spirits or 8-10 pints, was ‘generally 
regarded as unsafe’.96  
The ACA’s provisional approach, and reluctance to either offer firm 
guidelines on ‘safe drinking’, or wholly endorse stronger population level 
control measures, was a result of their recognition that such issues were 
‘controversial’ and ‘sensitive’.  The Committee were unsure about the extent 
to which it was ‘justifiable to interfere with the activities of drinkers on account 
of those who may cause or come to harm’.  The issue was not ‘thought to be 
one on which a Government could impose its will without paying the most 
careful regard to the views of the people.’97  As a result, the ACA argued that 
‘stricter controls cannot and should not be introduced without informed public 
discussion.’  Moreover, ‘The problems resulting from alcohol misuse have not 
yet been widely enough discussed: we believe that the public should be given 
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more information, including an estimate of the true cost of alcohol misuse to 
society so that it can reach a realistic view of the restraints that should be 
placed on drinking.’98  This approach was also endorsed by the DHSS’s 
booklet, Prevention and Health: Everybody’s Business, which stated that ‘The 
best combination of strategies for our society, and the attitudes to alcohol 
which should be encouraged in it, are matters which deserve public 
discussion.’99 
Indeed, some level of public debate about alcohol health education 
campaigns was already taking place.  Most of the broadsheet newspapers 
simply summarised the key findings of the ACA’s report, but some of the more 
libertarian publications offered editorials on the wider issue of health 
education.  An article by Colin Welch in the Daily Telegraph was highly critical 
of government backed health education efforts against smoking and drinking, 
which he saw as a ‘sinister step towards tyranny’.  Taylor asserted that ‘When 
the British people imposed on the State the duty of caring for all our ailments 
free of change we forgot that wise adage – there is no free lunch… For the 
State at that very moment acquired the right to order us to live healthy lives – 
to eschew this or that substance or practice’.100  ‘Peter Simple’, also writing in 
the Daily Telegraph, took a similar tack.  He stated that government plans to 
put a health warning on the labels of alcoholic drinks was an ‘idiotic message’ 
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and a ‘symbol of bureaucratic welfarism.’101  Others in the media, however, 
were less critical of such an approach.  Reporting on a speech made by 
Ennals, where the minister had asked whether or not alcohol problems should 
be tackled more ‘vigorously’, The Economist responded ‘The answer surely is 
yes: and for a start his [Ennals’] advisory committee on alcoholism has 
suggested preventive measures that would not conflict with the enjoyment of 
normal drinking.’102  It is impossible to know the extent to which the wider 
public shared the views expressed by ‘Simple’ and Taylor, but their presence 
did suggest that there was some level of feeling that introducing stronger 
control measures on alcohol might be an unacceptable restriction of liberty, 
something the ACA itself had acknowledged.  There was a perceived need for 
public debate about the approach to be taken to alcohol, and the extent to 
which individual drinking should be curbed for the public good.   
 
Drinking Sensibly, 1977-1981 
An opportunity for dialogue about the response to alcohol was provided by a 
‘nationwide debate’ initiated at the end of 1977.  When launching the debate, 
Ennals said that there were questions about alcohol that ‘we must all ask 
ourselves.’  Was it the role of Government, he wondered, ‘to concern itself 
with personal behaviour – or do you believe the Government has a duty to 
represent the interests of the community and seek to contain a growing ill?’  
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Should Government, Ennals inquired, ‘impose a much bigger tax on all 
intoxicating drink as a deterrent to drinking, or would this be unfair to the 
majority who are sensible drinkers’?103  A ‘consultative document’, to be 
prepared by the DHSS, was intended to ‘outline for discussion the arguments 
for and against various possible preventive measures’ and it was hoped that 
‘the ensuing debate will assist the Government to draw up firm proposals for 
improvement.’104  Work began on the document in 1977, and it was intended 
that the text be published in 1978, but it took until 1981 for the final report, 
Drinking Sensibly, to appear.   
The long gestation of Drinking Sensibly was the result of significant 
interdepartmental tension.  The central difficulty surrounded the control of 
alcohol prices, the impact that this would have on consumption, and whether 
or not taxation should be used to increase the price of drink.  Not everyone 
within the DHSS was convinced of the Ledermann thesis, but by 1976 key 
officials and the Minister were of the opinion that ‘there is sufficient evidence 
available to link price, consumption and damage as to make it desirable that 
drink in all its forms should not become cheaper [original emphasis].’105  Such 
views found their way in to an early draft of the consultation document.  The 
document stated that ‘There seems little doubt that lowering the price of 
alcoholic drink does tend to encourage greater consumption, while raising 
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prices leads to a fall-off in the amount people drink.’  The draft was equivocal 
on whether or not tax should be used to increase price – this was something 
for the government and the wider public to decide – but the document implied 
that inexpensive alcohol meant that the problem would worsen: ‘Cheaper and 
cheaper drink prices would severely hamper efforts through health education 
and other means to tackle the problem of alcohol misuse and perhaps make 
all such efforts abortive.’106 
Other government departments did not see things the same way.  The 
Department of Trade, Customs and Excise, MAFF, the Home Office and the 
Treasury all had difficulties with aspects of the draft text on alcohol taxation 
and price disincentives.  As a letter from an official at Customs and Excise 
noted, ‘It is clear that this chapter [on tax and price control] raises issues 
about which there is considerable disagreement between Departments.’107  
The Department of Trade were concerned about ‘the practicability and 
desirability of seeking to hold down the consumption of alcohol through action 
on prices, and the implications for competition and consumer choice of any 
more restrictive approach to licensing.’108  MAFF wanted the document to 
recognise the importance of the drinks industry to the economy.  They wanted 
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the document to ‘avoid suggesting that there is one single problem that can 
be dealt with by general solutions.  General solutions would penalise unfairly 
the majority of sensible drinkers and without any guarantee that the number of 
problem drinkers would be reduced.’109  The Treasury sought to delay release 
of the document, and possibly prevent it from being published at all.  The 
change of government in May 1979 offered an opportunity to ‘seek guidance 
from Ministers before a great deal of additional effort is put into revising the 
present draft.’  Treasury officials noted that ‘The first question is whether the 
present Government will wish to publish any document along these lines; and 
we for our part would want to recommend to our Ministers that they should 
consider carefully the policy implications before coming to a firm decision.’110    
The consultative document survived, but in a significantly modified form, 
and only after it was approved at Cabinet level.111  The section on price and 
tax was re-written substantially.  No direct comment was made about the link 
between price and consumption; instead the final document simply 
summarised the recommendations made by other committees and reports, 
such as the ACA’s Prevention.112  Where the document was unequivocal, 
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however, was on the issue of taxation.  It stated that ‘Taking account of the 
economic as well as the health and social considerations, and bearing in mind 
the practical difficulties involved, the Government cannot accept 
recommendations that have been made for the systematic use of tax rates as 
a means of regulating consumption.’113  The possibility of using taxation to 
control the price of drink was not up for discussion.  Indeed, the overall tone of 
Drinking Sensibly was not as ‘consultative’ or as open to ‘debate’ as intended 
originally.  Although the text was billed as a ‘discussion document’ it was 
unclear how such discussion would take place.  Instead, Drinking Sensibly 
was intended to ‘help clarify public views’ and offer ‘statements of the 
government’s position’.114 
In any case, it does not seem as if Drinking Sensibly stimulated much 
public debate.  The DHSS had intended that the document ‘be aimed at the 
intelligent layman, in the hope that the Press and TV will be sufficiently 
interested to follow up some of the points and so reach a wider audience.’115   
Yet, they decided to publish the document with a plain cover, since the 
anticipated readership was ‘the influencers of opinion’ rather than ‘impulse 
buyers’.116  The media did report on the publication of Drinking Sensibly, but 
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most of the newspapers just summarised the document’s key statements and 
highlighted the fact that the government was not recommending an increase 
in the tax on alcohol.  The Guardian was alone in sounding a critical note: 
‘The Government is to take no direct action – either by tax increases on 
alcohol or by curbing drinks advertising – to halt a dramatic rise in the misuse 
of alcohol.’  Instead, the ‘drive to curb abuse would rely entirely on voluntary 
effort’.117  The only other source of criticism came from the medical press.  
The psychiatrist and addiction expert Thomas Bewley, writing in the British 
Medical Journal, summed up his views on the document as ‘Drinking sensibly, 
perhaps.  Thinking sensibly, no.’118 
Although Drinking Sensibly provoked little public debate at the time, the 
report, and especially the notion of ‘drinking sensibly’ was important.  The 
DHSS pondered long and hard over the title of the document.  Alternatives 
included ‘Responsible Drinking’, ‘Sensible Drinking’, ‘Sensible Attitudes to 
Drinking’, ‘Preventing Alcohol Misuse’, and ‘Alcohol – The Right Balance’.119  
Other suggested titles were less than serious, perhaps because they were 
developed in the run up to Christmas, 1979.  It seems unlikely that ‘Not Only 
Mother’s Ruin’, ‘Down the Hatch or Down the Drain?’, ‘Don’t Trifle With 
Sherry’, ‘I Drink Therefore I Am’, ‘Steady as she Flows’ or ‘Blithe Spirit’ were 
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ever in contention, but the debate over the title of the consultative document 
does draw attention to the way in which alcohol consumption was framed by 
the text.120  Although ‘Drinking Sensibly’ emerged as the victor, this was not 
defined in the final document.  The text referred to ‘sensible attitudes towards 
the use of alcohol’ but it was not at all clear what these were.121  Drinking 
Sensibly mentioned the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ suggestion that 
drinkers limit themselves to no more than four pints of beer, or four double 
spirits, or one bottle of wine a day, but the report also pointed out ‘drawbacks’ 
to such an approach, such as the varied effect of alcohol on different people.  
The ‘sensible drinker’ may have been synonymous with the ‘responsible 
citizen’, as ‘Responsible citizens must consider in the light of these facts what 
they themselves can do to limit the harm to their own health and the health of 
others’.122 The rationality of the citizen-consumer was being appealed to, not 
only to protect his or her own health, but also that of the wider public.   
 
Conclusion 
At the time of publication of Drinking Sensibly it seems as if the concepts of 
sensible drinking and the sensible drinker were still in development, but they 
came to hold significance in the later evolution of alcohol policy and alcohol 
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health education.  On a practical level, a more specific notion of what sensible 
drinking consisted of in terms of the amount of alcohol consumed began to 
develop in the latter half of the 1980s.  Suggested daily limits had already 
been proposed by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but in 1984 the HEC 
issued a pamphlet setting out the ‘safe limits’, to which people should restrict 
their drinking.  ‘Safe limits’ for drinking were defined as 18 ‘standard drinks’  
(equivalent to half a pint of beer, a small glass of wine or a single measure of 
spirits) a week for men and nine for women.123  In 1986 and 1987 the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Physicians and the Royal 
College of General Practitioners each published reports on alcohol, and all 
made the same recommendations with regards to consumption limits.124  The 
reports suggested that ‘sensible limits of drinking’ consisted of not more than 
21 ‘units’ of alcohol a week for men, and not more than 14 units a week for 
women.  A unit of alcohol was equal to 10ml or 8g of pure alcohol, or about 
half a pint of beer.  In January 2016, the recommended weekly limit to alcohol 
consumption for men (previously 21 units) was brought into line with that of 
women (14 units). 
Fluctuations in the recommended levels of alcohol consumption over 
time and the fact that many individuals continue to exceed this limits suggests 
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that ‘sensible drinking’ was a mutable concept not a fixed category.125  
Nonetheless, the unit, and with it sensible drinking, have survived as a 
cornerstone of alcohol policy for the last 30 years.  Population level 
arguments about alcohol consumption have begun to reappear, but as the 
recent abandonment of the introduction of minimum unit pricing in England 
makes clear, such measures are bitterly contested.126  Public health policy 
and practice around alcohol continues to centre on health education, on 
persuading individuals to alter their drinking behaviour.  Whether such 
measures ‘work’ is still open to question.  There is evidence to indicate that 
health education can help push alcohol problems up the public and political 
agenda, but there is little to suggest that on its own health education can 
change drinking behaviour.127   
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In a sense, however, the debate about whether or not health education 
works misses a more fundamental point.  The promotion of such a strategy 
was the result not only of the activities of vested interests, like the alcohol 
industry, but part of a more complex negotiation between different ‘publics’.  
Three publics can be found within the public health approach to dealing with 
alcohol: drinkers, the population and citizen-consumers.  Drinkers were the 
targets of alcohol health education, but over the course of the 1970s, the type 
of drinker being aimed at changed.  At the beginning of the decade, the focus 
was very much on alcoholics – the ‘drunk’ of the first phase of the HEC’s 
campaign in the North East.  In the middle years of the 1970s, efforts centred 
on the ‘boozer’, a heavy drinker, but not necessarily an alcoholic.  By the end 
of the decade, however, attention appeared to have shifted to the ‘sensible 
drinker’, to encouraging all drinkers to consume alcohol within proscribed 
limits.  Such a move from focusing on the problem drinker to encompassing 
all drinkers brought a much larger group of people into the remit of alcohol 
policy.  This shift was in line with a broader development within the ‘new 
public health’ to focus on the healthy as well as the sick, on disease 
prevention and on reducing the risk to health associated with certain kinds of 
behaviours.  The ‘sensible drinker’ fitted within this approach.   
The ‘sensible drinker’ was not, however, the only public at work and 
health education was not the only possible approach to dealing with the 
problems posed by alcohol.  The Ledermann thesis introduced the idea that 
drinking levels within the entire population mattered and to reduce alcohol 
problems greater control of the price and availability of drink was required.  
The political and economic difficulties encountered by those who supported a 
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population level approach were also bound up with the apparent needs of a 
third public: the citizen-consumer.  Public health policy makers were 
concerned about implementing stronger levels of control over alcohol as this 
was thought to interfere with individual liberty, to be an unacceptable level of 
state intrusion into the private realm, but also an undesirable restriction on 
consumption.  This could be seen as a re-run of an age-old dilemma for public 
health, about the extent to which it was acceptable to restrict individual 
freedom in order to ensure the public good, but it was also bound up with 
newer issues around consumer choice.  Targeting individual behaviour 
through health education rather than addressing the wider environmental 
factors that encouraged people to drink could also be regarded as a repeat of 
earlier public health attempts to focus on the technical fix rather than address 
the social conditions that underpinned health problems.  The ‘new public 
health’ was not, perhaps, so new after all.   
But there was something different about the formulation of both the 
public and public health in post-war Britain.  The case of alcohol health 
education suggests that there was more than one type of public, and more 
than one public health approach.  The needs of each of these did not 
necessarily coincide, resulting in a confused response: one that targeted 
individuals at the same time as being concerned with the wider public, that 
wanted to get drinkers to consume alcohol ‘sensibly’, but was unclear about 
what this meant.  Such confusion speaks to the limits of public health and the 
multi-faceted nature of the public.  Not everybody likes a drink, but nobody 
likes to be told what to drink. 
 
